BEPS and the New International Tax Order by Christians, Allison
BYU Law Review
Volume 2016 | Issue 6 Article 4
December 2016
BEPS and the New International Tax Order
Allison Christians
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Taxation-Transnational Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allison Christians, BEPS and the New International Tax Order, 2016 BYU L. Rev. 1603 (2017).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2016/iss6/4
  
BEPS and the New International Tax Order 
Allison Christians* 
 
Nations across the world are currently engaged in a coordinated 
international effort, ostensibly to curb excessive tax avoidance by the 
world’s biggest multinational companies. This Article contends, however, 
that the most likely impact will be to entrench a monopoly held by a small 
number of rich countries over the policymaking processes that created the 
tax avoidance problem to begin with. To examine this contention and 
probe possible solutions to it, the Article considers the legal and 
institutional components of the coordination project, by situating them 
historically and analyzing their multi-functionality as both norm 
diffusion and institutional reinforcement mechanisms. The Article 
concludes that while history has repeatedly taught the world to be 
pessimistic about the potential for meaningful reform of the 
international tax order, there are reasons for cautious optimism in some 
of the recently-introduced institutions and processes. To avoid perpetual 
returns to a damaging status quo, careful attention will need to be 
devoted to ensuring meaningful participation by countries that have 
been systematically excluded from the global tax policy dialogue to date. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rich countries have long sought to overcome tax jurisdiction gaps 
and overlaps by engaging in consensus building over nonbinding soft 
law norms via the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). The OECD’s most recent initiative seeks to 
counter certain forms of international tax avoidance, which it has 
coined “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS).1 In response to 
past criticisms of its exclusive and insular grip on the development of 
the global tax policy norms that led to BEPS, the OECD invited 
selected non-member states to participate in developing its initiative. 
It now invites all countries of the world to sign on to a new framework 
it is building for BEPS implementation. 
The new framework is not merely a means to achieve consistent 
implementation of a specific set of mutually-agreed tax goals, however. 
More fundamentally, the new framework is a means to forestall the 
rise of rival international tax policy-making institutions and networks 
that challenge the OECD’s tax policy prescriptions. Even while it 
ostensibly expands its reach outward to non-OECD countries, the 
norm diffusion mechanisms of BEPS seem to entrench the OECD’s 
monopoly over tax policy making: the bad old days of exclusivity and 
insularity may not yet be excised after all. It remains to be seen 
whether the new framework, at minimum, sets a path for a more 
inclusive international tax order going forward. 
BEPS is more forceful than previous OECD initiatives, laying 
down three tiers of norms in the form of “minimum standards,” 
“recommendations,” and “best practices” to be operationalized in 
both OECD and non-OECD member states via multiple soft and hard 
 
 1. BEPS Actions, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-actions.htm (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2016). 
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law mechanisms. The mechanisms express the distinct nature of these 
norm tiers. The OECD expects its thirty-four member states—
including Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, the United States, and 
Western Europe—to directly implement the first tier, minimum 
standards, by legislation and treaty. The organization is currently 
negotiating and will deliver a specified set of the second tier, 
recommendations, in the form of a new multilateral instrument that is 
currently under negotiation. It has or will soon embed other 
recommendations and certain best practices in other OECD 
documents, such as guidelines and model treaties. Finally, it will 
engage in peer review of all of the minimum standards, as well as peer 
monitoring of some of the recommendations and some other practices 
not currently articulated as consensus positions. 
Responding to concerns about the legitimacy of articulating 
global consensus positions from a body with exclusive membership, 
the OECD worked with certain non-OECD members—referred to as 
“BEPS invitees”—to build the BEPS consensus.2 It has now invited 
all interested non-OECD states to become “BEPS Associates.”3 
Becoming a BEPS Associate entails adopting the initiative’s minimum 
standards and joining a new coordination architecture—the “Inclusive 
Framework”—organized for the purpose of measuring and 
 
 2. OECD, About BEPS and the Inclusive Framework, Invitees and Countries of Relevance, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-about.htm#invitees (“A group of other countries and 
jurisdictions are participating in the inclusive framework, while they are considering whether or 
not to commit to the implementation of the BEPS Package. These countries and jurisdictions 
participate as Invitees”); see G20, G20 LEADERS DECLARATION 9 (2012), http://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131069.pdf (supporting 
work of OECD on BEPS); OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 25 
(2013) [hereinafter OECD 2013 BEPS REPORT], https://www.oecd.org/
ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf (“[I]nterested G20 countries that are not members of the OECD will 
be invited to be part of the project as Associates, i.e. on an equal footing with OECD members 
(including at the level of the subsidiary bodies involved in the work on BEPS), and will be 
expected to associate themselves with the outcome of the BEPS initiative. Other non-members 
could be invited to participate as Invitees on an ad hoc basis.”). BEPS invitees included China 
and India, key G20 states, among others. See, e.g., Ernst & Young, Global Tax Alert: BEPS 
Associates Increased to 82 Countries 2 (June 2016), http://www.ey.com/
Publication/vwLUAssets/BEPS_associates_increased_to_82_countries/$FILE/2016G_0185
9-161Gbl_BEPS%20associates%20increased—%20to%2082%20—countries.pdf (depicting a 
map of BEPS Associates and Invitees). 
 3. All Interested Countries and Jurisdictions to Be Invited to Join Global Efforts Led by the 
OECD and G20 to Close International Tax Loopholes, OECD.ORG (Feb. 23 2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/all-interested-countries-and-jurisdictions-to-be-invited-to-
join-global-efforts-led-by-the-oecd-and-g20-to-close-international-tax-loopholes.htm. 
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monitoring BEPS compliance across countries.4 The parameters of 
compliance with many of the BEPS norms will not be clear until 
countries agree to terms of reference for peer review, which will occur 
within one or more subsidiary network bodies.5 All OECD member- 
 
 4. See OECD, About BEPS and the Inclusive Framework, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-about.htm.  Prior to BEPS, the OECD engaged in peer review 
via three networks: the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP), the Forum on Tax 
Administration MAP Forum (the FTA MAP Forum), and the Global Forum on Transparency 
and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (the Global Forum)—each of which included 
non-OECD states to various extents. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-139-15, 
BACKGROUND, SUMMARY, AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND 
PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT 8 (2015), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=
startdown&id=4853 (describing the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices); Forum on Tax 
Administration, OECD.ORG, https://www.oecd.org/tax/forum-on-tax-administration/ (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2016); Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes, OECD.org, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2016). In 
the course of the BEPS initiative, the OECD sought changes at the level of the OECD Council 
to expand access by non-OECD members to the Committee on Fiscal Affairs itself, in order to 
enable it to invite BEPS Associates as equal participants in further BEPS negotiation and 
implementation. OECD, BACKGROUND BRIEF: INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR BEPS 
IMPLEMENTATION 1, 5–6 (2016), https://www.oecd.org/tax/background-brief-inclusive-
framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf. The OECD settled on the term “Inclusive 
Framework” to describe a set of measures or functions that the OECD will use to make equal 
participation by nonmembers possible under the framework of the OECD, despite the limited 
membership of the organization as a whole, rather than forming a wholly new international 
institution or turning to the United Nations to host future tax policy development. See OECD, 
DEVELOPING A MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT TO MODIFY BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, ACTION 
15–2015 FINAL REPORT 3 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN 15], http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315401e.pdf (stating that in the process of the BEPS 
deliberations, the “G20 and OECD countries . . . worked on an equal footing,” with the input 
of the European Commission). The G20 is an international network of finance ministers and 
central bankers from eleven high-income countries and eight lower-income countries, plus 
representatives from the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
World Bank. Twelve of its member countries are OECD member countries; of the remaining 
eight countries, five have been invited to join the OECD, and the remaining three have been 
invited to participate in OECD deliberations in a capacity other than as members. OECD Invites 
Five Countries to Membership Talks, Offers Enhanced Engagement to Other Big Players, 
OECD.ORG (May 16, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/general/oecdinvitesfivecountriesto
membershiptalksoffersenhancedengagementtootherbigplayers.htm (“OECD countries agreed 
to invite Chile, Estonia, Israel, Russia, and Slovenia to open discussions for membership of the 
Organisation and offered enhanced engagement, with a view to possible membership, to Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa.”). 
 5. Most of the BEPS implementation mechanisms involve the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, with 135 members; the Forum 
on Tax Administration MAP Forum, with 46 members, comes into play in the case of treaty-
based dispute resolution. See further discussion infra Section II.D. Terms of reference for Action 
14 were released in October 2016. OECD, BEPS ACTION 14 ON MORE EFFECTIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION MECHANISMS: PEER REVIEW DOCUMENTS (2016) [hereinafter ACTION 14 
TERMS OF REFERENCE], http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-action-14-on-more-effective-
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and BEPS Associate-governments were expected to begin integrating 
BEPS guidelines into their domestic tax practices as early as January 
of 2016.6 
The strength of the OECD consensus appears variable. 
Compliance with some of the minimum standards is to be measured 
in a peer monitoring body, while others are apparently left to good 
faith alone (but likely future reassessment as well). Fidelity to some 
recommendations will similarly be peer-monitored, while other 
recommendations and best practices will be released in the new 
multilateral treaty, the OECD Model Treaty, guidance, or some 
combination thereof, leaving uncertainty regarding the extent to 
which a given principle will ultimately be adopted in national contexts 
or otherwise form persuasive, let alone binding, authority. Peer 
monitoring will also extend to certain legal regimes for which the 
OECD has not yet articulated a consensus position. This confirms that 
the OECD will seek future rounds of consensus-building framed and 
informed by the BEPS initiative. 
The OECD’s work on BEPS thus represents a continuing 
progression toward a global tax regime guided and policed by its key 
 
dispute-resolution-peer-review-documents.pdf. Because this document was released just prior to 
the publication of this article, its contents have not been analyzed herein. 
 6. See BEPS-Frequently Asked Questions: Top 10 FAQs About BEPS, OECD.ORG 
[hereinafter BEPS-Frequently Asked Questions], http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequently
askedquestions.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (“A comprehensive package of measures has 
been agreed upon. Countries are committed to this comprehensive package and to its consistent 
implementation. These measures range from new minimum standards to revision of existing 
standards, common approaches which will facilitate the convergence of national practices and 
guidance drawing on best practices.”). There are some indications that states are fulfilling this 
mandate. For example, several states have adopted or are in the process of adopting legislation 
requiring additional tax disclosure by large multinational corporations, in accordance with the 
minimum standard on Country by Country reporting. See, e.g., Finance Bill of 2015, Part H 
(2015) (India), http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2016-17/memo/mem1.pdf; Finance Bill (Bill 
No. 95/1976), Pt. 31 (Ir.), http://www.finance.gov.ie/sites/default/files/Finance%20Bill
%202015%20As%20Initiated.pdf; Høringsnotat forslag om endring av forskrift om land for 
landrappor tering, (2016), (Nor.), https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/5181c
306504e4bd18031b327d5034a31/hoeringsnotat.pdf; Country-by-Country Reporting, 81 
Fed. Reg. 42,482, 42,482–92 (June 30, 2016) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (U.S.); 
Australian Taxation Office, Law Companion Guidelines, LCG 2015/3, Subdivision 815-E of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997: Country-by-Country Reporting, ATO.GOV.AU,  
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/view.htm?DocID=COG%2FLCG20153%2FNAT%2FATO
%2F00001&PiT=99991231235958%20-%20P30 (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); HMRC, Policy 
Paper, Country by Country Reporting, GOV.UK (Feb. 26, 2016) (U.K.), https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/country-by-country-reporting-updated/country-by-country-report
ing-updated#detailed-proposal; infra Section II.A. 
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member states. Yet it must proceed cautiously against the foil of 
sovereign autonomy that is seen as critical to the legitimacy of the 
institution as the curator of a transnational network rather than a 
supra-national authority. Maintaining this balance requires diplomacy 
and pragmatism on the part of those seeking to change the substance 
of national legislation and administrative practices as well as 
international bargains among sovereign states. 
Overseeing the drafting of multilateral agreements, deploying 
model language and guidelines, and establishing peer review of 
national practices collectively endow OECD norms with greater law-
like impact and increase its claims on national cooperation, all while 
maintaining the position that the organization is not “imposing” any 
rules on sovereign states.7 This is a delicate balance, the successful 
navigation of which will impact the coherence of the international tax 
regime going forward. Given the competing aims of sovereignty and 
soft law cooperation, finding a stable balance is unlikely. More likely, 
some individuals, companies, and countries will continue to benefit 
from lack of global tax coherence, taking full advantage of gaps and 
inconsistencies in the international tax regime in their tax planning 
and tax rulemaking, respectively. Other countries may suffer from the 
negative effects of tax planning and strategically designed foreign tax 
rules that makes raising revenues from international transactions and 
activities virtually impossible.8 
As a result, countries will try to continually revisit the BEPS 
bargain. Those that sought and expected but ultimately realize neither 
increased tax revenues nor investment are likely to seek consensus on 
alternative policy choices to those addressed in 2015. Those that 
sought compromises on tax policy to protect their foreign investment 
promotion strategies are likely to continue to defend those policy 
choices. How the newly revised institutional framework built to 
implement BEPS will impact this future bargaining is an open 
question. Countries that fall into the former category and that were 
not meaningfully involved in the initial BEPS development will likely 
 
 7. See Allison Christians, Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy, 9 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2010) (describing OECD’s network-based policy making and 
its general opacity, afforded to it because “the OECD is not a law-making body and is not open 
to direct public scrutiny in the same manner”). 
 8. Some countries will successfully turn to alternative sources of tax revenue, such as 
consumption, excise, property, and estate taxes, while others will have fewer choices. For a 
discussion, see Allison Christians, Global Trends and Constraints on Tax Policy in the Least 
Developed Countries, 42 U.B.C. L. REV. 239 (2010). 
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be especially interested to know whether the OECD’s new inclusivity 
will ultimately translate into a better chance to meet their revenue 
goals going forward. 
Accordingly, it is important to establish the baseline for global tax 
policy negotiation as the BEPS consensus unfolds in implementation. 
That is the aim of this Article. To do so, it examines the OECD’s 
framework for BEPS norms and implementation mechanisms in order 
to make predictions about where the OECD will lead the world next 
in terms of both substantive rule modifications and international tax 
relations. Part I explains the role of the OECD as a tax policy 
consensus-building network and the hard and soft law instruments 
and processes it uses to achieve its ends. Part II sketches a matrix of 
the OECD’s current tax policy priorities, as indicated by the plans laid 
out in the 2015 BEPS reports. Part III analyzes how the chosen 
mechanisms entrench the OECD’s position as the principal architect 
of international cooperation on tax, and probes at the prospects for 
the new Inclusive Framework in allowing challenges to historical 
patterns of norm-making. The Article concludes with an analysis of 
the potential for meaningful reform of the international tax order 
stemming from some of the OECD’s recently-introduced institutions 
and processes. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW ORDER 
To understand why taxation depends on international 
cooperation, and how the OECD has been pivotal in developing it, 
requires a basic facility with the central conflicts inherent to the 
exercise of taxing income in an economically globalized world. When 
capital, goods, and (to a lesser extent) labor move around the globe 
with little restriction, several countries may, in accordance with 
generally accepted principles, claim the same taxpayer, the same 
transaction, or the same activity.9 Equally, and according to the same 
principles, some taxpayers, transactions, and activities fall in the space 
between jurisdictional rules.10 The result can be overlapping tax 
 
 9. See, e.g., Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 IND. L.J. 1407, 1414–15 (2012). 
For example, where a resident of Canada earns a dividend on stock in a French company, it is 
universally accepted that France, as the state of the source of the income, is entitled to tax the 
dividend upon its payment, while Canada, as the state of residence of the recipient, is entitled to 
tax the dividend upon its receipt. 
 10. Id. at 1416. For example, this could happen if a resident of Canada receives an amount 
from a French source that is exempt from taxation in France because it does not meet a given 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1610 
claims—“double taxation”—or gaps in taxation, sometimes referred 
to as “double non-taxation.”11 Both double-taxation and double non-
taxation can be addressed through unilateral action to some extent, 
but where they cannot, they become tax base coordination problems. 
For some kinds of tax, states have dealt with base coordination 
problems by trading policy autonomy for cooperation. This entails 
entering into multilateral treaties and using supranational institutions 
to monitor compliance, mediate disputes, and impose remedies in 
cases of breach.12 These kinds of “hard law” methods have been used 
more sporadically and less uniformly in income taxation.13 Instead, 
states rely on a combination of mainly bilateral treaties14 tied together 
and reinforced by a web of “soft law” coordination methods,15 
including “network-based collaboration, modeling, and 
peer pressure.”16 
The legal order created by this combination of methods has 
evolved over a century under the guidance of various international 
 
statutory threshold, while also being exempt from taxation in Canada because it is not considered 
income under domestic principles. 
 11. Id. at 1415–20. Double taxation could occur due to source-residence overlap, or it 
could occur because two (or more) countries view a given income as domestic source or view a 
given taxpayer as a resident for tax purposes. Id. Double non-taxation may be caused by a lack 
of effective rules and coordination among states, or strategic tax competition by states, or 
both. Id. 
 12. The most visible of these agreements is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187. Tax scholars have occasionally studied how forms of taxation other 
than tariffs fit within the WTO paradigm. See, e.g., Michael Daly, WTO Rules on Direct Taxation, 
29 WORLD ECON. 527 (2006); Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
1621 (2001). This line of inquiry has recently reopened in light of the European Union’s fiscal 
state aid cases, which have raised scrutiny regarding the nature of certain tax regimes as subsidies. 
See Allison Christians & Marco Garofalo, Using Tax as an Investment Promotion Tool, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/abstract=2796126. 
 13. Christians, supra note 9, at 1419. 
 14. There are a few notable exceptions, including regional income tax conventions and 
multilateral agreements for cross-border cooperation in tax administration. See, e.g., OECD AND 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS (2011), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/
download/2311331e.pdf (recently expanded and expected to play a key role in the 
implementation of the BEPS norms). See infra Part III. 
 15. Allison Christians, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
 16. Id. at 3. International law scholars use the term ‘soft law’ to describe norms that may 
not themselves constitute law but . . . compel a law-like sense of obligation in states. See, e.g., C. 
M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 850, 850–51 (1989). For a discussion regarding the use of the term in the context 
of tax policy, see Allison Christians, Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 325 (2007). 
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organizations, with the OECD at the center.17 In successfully 
deploying a combination of hard and soft law instruments and 
processes and consistently building upon its past practices, the OECD 
has formed a complex pluralistic legal environment in which iterative 
cycles of norm formation, implementation, contestation, and 
redefinition take place.18 As the latest iterative cycle, the BEPS 
initiative vividly illustrates how hard and soft law mechanisms and 
processes combine to form a recognizable international legal order. 
A. Legal Instruments 
The first form of international tax coordination involves hard law, 
which includes domestic laws as well as international treaties. States 
initially turned to domestic solutions to solve the problems of both 
double- and non-taxation arising as a result of cross-border business 
and investment activities.19 Double-taxation, which occurs when more 
than one country seeks to tax a given income stream and no one 
country’s claim is exclusive, was seen as so destructive a force that 
states were quick to produce unilateral solutions.20 Two methods 
prevail: credits against domestic taxes for foreign taxes paid and 
exemptions from domestic tax for foreign income.21 However, 
unilateral solutions are typically seen as second-best solutions 
compared to coordinated allocation of taxing rights among 
 
 17. The League of Nations was instrumental to developing tax cooperation mechanisms 
in the early 1920s and its influence continues to today, principally under the direction of the 
OECD. See id. at 9–14. Other institutions and networks, including the International Chamber 
of Commerce, the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
World Bank (WB), have involved themselves in various international tax policy efforts over the 
years, but the OECD has eclipsed these rival sources through a unique combination of 
geopolitical power dynamics, dedicated expertise, and fidelity to tradition. See PETER CARROLL 
& AYNSLEY KELLOW, THE OECD: A STUDY OF ORGANISATIONAL ADAPTATION (2011); 
Richard Eccleston, The OECD and Global Economic Governance, 65 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 243, 
243–46 (2011). 
 18. For more analysis of the recursive cycle of international tax law, see Allison Christians, 
Historic, Comparative and Evolutionary Analysis of Tax Systems, in SEPARATION OF POWERS AND 
TAX SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS 287, 287–309 (Misabel de Abreu Machado Derzi ed., 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1674673, and Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The 
Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of 
Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135, 1147 (2007). 
 19. See generally Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
939 (2000). 
 20. See, e.g., Christians, supra note 9, at 1416–17. 
 21. Id. 
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countries.22 States have therefore consistently sought alternatives to 
unilateral mechanisms by pursing bilateral and multilateral agreements 
on tax. 
By way of example, like most countries, Canada’s income tax act 
generally provides Canadian taxpayers a credit for taxes paid to foreign 
countries on dividends received from foreign companies (to the extent 
such dividends would be subject to tax in Canada).23 Since, in the 
absence of constraints, it is likely that such foreign countries would 
also tax dividends paid by their companies to nonresidents,24 Canada 
might never collect revenue on foreign dividends received by its 
residents. At the same time, knowing that other countries intend to 
impose tax on dividends received by their residents from foreign 
sources might incentivize other countries to impose (or raise) their 
own taxes to the same level. It is for this reason that early opponents 
 
 22. A credit is a second-best solution to the problem of double taxation because it limits 
the residence country’s jurisdiction to tax to a residual (if any) after the source or host country 
imposes its tax. An agreement among countries to alter that result might be viewed as a better 
solution because it would typically limit the source country to a lower (or zero) tax rate in order 
to preserve the ability of the residence country to collect tax on the income. However, this 
position is not without controversy since in a treaty between countries of different economic 
means, the country expected to cede its right to tax is often the poorer one. See, e.g., Tsilly 
Dagan, BRICS: Theoretical Framework and the Potential of Cooperation, in BRICS AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION 15, 17–18 (Yariv Brauner & Pasquale 
Pistone eds., 2015). An exemption is a second-best solution because it does not take into account 
taxation in the other jurisdiction at all, thus creating the potential for double non-taxation and 
incentivizing tax competition. In this case, coordination among countries is necessary to ensure 
that the income is subject to tax in at least one country. The idea that all income should be taxed 
once is sometimes referred to as the “single tax principle.” See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, Who 
Invented the Single Tax Principle?: An Essay on the History of U.S. Treaty Policy, 59 N. Y. L. SCH. 
L. REV. 305, 306–07 (2014). 
 23. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 1, s 126 (5th Supp. Can.). 
 24. This is likely but not certain: In a formative report on double-taxation produced in 
1923, economists posited that source-based taxation may fall on the source state rather than the 
investor in certain cases; they therefore predicted that source countries would shy away from 
imposing source taxation on non-residents, while residence countries would need information 
from source countries in order to impose residence-based income taxation. GIJSBERT W. J. 
BRUINS ET AL., REPORT ON DOUBLE TAXATION 40–42 (1923) (explaining that source countries 
would avoid source taxation because it would either drive investment away to lower-tax source 
jurisdictions, or force the jurisdiction to offer higher returns to compensate for the tax). 
Consistent with this prediction, many countries provide various reductions and exemptions from 
tax for foreign investors. For an overview, see ERNST & YOUNG, WORLDWIDE CORPORATE TAX 
GUIDE (2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Worldwide_Corporate_Tax_
Guide_2016/$FILE/2016%20Worldwide%20Corporate%20Tax%20Guide.pdf (providing an 
overview of tax laws across 162 countries). 
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to the foreign tax credit in the United States called the regime “a 
present of the revenue to other countries.”25 
Tax treaties are a means (among other aims) to recalibrate this 
allocation of taxing rights. They do so by reducing source-based taxes, 
thereby reducing the tax credit amount and leaving some residual 
room for taxation by the residence country in a source-residence 
overlap situation.26 Thus, the grand bargain of the international tax 
order has been to use treaties to reduce source-based taxation in order 
to make the residence country’s relief measures less costly in terms of 
revenue foregone to foreign countries. 
Double non-taxation is the opposite problem, and it has been 
understood as a potentially destructive force in terms of protecting the 
tax base (although it has not always been viewed as equal in negative 
impact to the problem of double-taxation). Prior to BEPS, double 
non-taxation was typically addressed unilaterally through the use of 
allocation, valuation, and general and specific anti-avoidance rules, 
such as the adjustment of inter-company prices within an affiliated 
group (transfer pricing) and the deeming of certain payments to 
resident owners of controlled foreign corporations (such as subpart F 
in the United States and the foreign accrual property regime 
in Canada).27  
Laws to coordinate overlapping tax jurisdictions, whether in the 
form of domestic statutes, treaties, or judicial determinations, are a 
product of domestic legislative and regulatory power. They cannot be 
mandated by a non-state body, a foreign governmental body, or any 
 
 25. EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, DOUBLE TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL FISCAL 
COOPERATION 135 (1928). 
 26. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 19, at 944–45 (explaining that signatory countries use 
treaties not to address double taxation, since that is accomplished in domestic statutes, but rather 
to change the allocation of taxing rights, generally in order to reduce that collected by host 
countries in favor of increasing that collected by home countries); Veronika Daurer & Richard 
Krever, Choosing Between the UN and OECD Tax Policy Models: An African Case Study, 22 AFR. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1–2 (2014) (“Treaties limit the source country’s taxing rights, leaving 
more room for the country in which the investor or business is resident to tax the profits.”); 
Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law: Benefits for American Investors and Enterprises 
Abroad, 2 INT’L L. 692, 693–94 (1968) (explaining that the United States originally became 
interested in pursuing treaties because they “would reduce the amount of foreign taxes that 
could be credited against the United States tax . . . and possibly leave something for the Treasury 
to collect”). 
 27. For the definition of Subpart F income in the United States, see 26 U.S.C. § 952 
(2012); for the statutory references to foreign accrual property income in Canada, see Income 
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 1, ss 94, 94.1 (5th Supp. Can.). 
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other group outside the parameters of a negotiated treaty. However, 
states have long used international organizations and networks, 
especially the OECD, to influence the shape of law by developing the 
means for policy learning and emulation to take place. This has been 
accomplished through a combination of models, guidance, and peer 
review. This is why the OECD is often described as purveyor of soft 
law: it has successfully used these non-binding but persuasive methods 
to curate the international tax order as we recognize it today.28 
B. Model Treaties and Guidance 
If asked to source the defining principles that comprise the 
international tax law order, most tax law experts would quickly point 
to the OECD’s model income tax convention (OECD Model)29 as the 
wellspring.30 Some 3,000 bilateral (hard law) tax treaties are said to 
reflect the OECD Model. In fact, those 3,000 treaties also reflect the 
influence of two other models as well: one developed by the United 
Nations (UN Model) and the other by the United States (U.S. 
Model).31 Over time, there has been fairly strong convergence among 
 
 28. BEPS-Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6. (“[The BEPS outputs] are soft law 
legal instruments. They are not legally binding but there is an expectation that they will be 
implemented accordingly by countries that are part of the consensus. The past track record in 
the tax area is rather positive. . . . [A]ll OECD and G20 countries have committed to consistent 
implementation in the areas of preventing treaty shopping, Country-by-Country Reporting, 
fighting harmful tax practices and improving dispute resolution.”). 
 29. OECD, MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON 
CAPITAL (2014) [hereinafter OECD MODEL], http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/2014-
model-tax-convention-articles.pdf. 
 30. See U.N. DEPT. OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE 
TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at vi (2011), 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Model_2011_Update.pdf (“[T]he OECD 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital . . . ha[s] had a profound influence on 
international treaty practice . . . .”); see generally REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX 
AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME (2007); HUGH 
J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (2d 
ed. 2004); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL 
ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME 
TAX TREATIES (1992). 
 31. The newest version of the U.S. Model is formally referred to as the United States 
Model Income Tax Convention. UNITED STATES TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME 
TAX CONVENTION (2016) [hereinafter U.S. MODEL], https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-US%20Model-2016.pdf. The U.S. Model is 
structurally very similar to the OECD and U.N. Models; yet, it stands alone as a conveyer of 
certain tax policy standards specific to the United States. See Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties 
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the models, with the U.S. Model being heavily influential on the 
others given the importance of the United States in global markets.32 
Indeed, the OECD’s action items concerning treaty use and abuse are 
expressly conditioned on developments in the U.S. Model language.33 
For example, in late 2015, the U.S. Treasury released proposed 
changes to the U.S. Model in draft form in order to globalize U.S. 
policy preferences in the context of the BEPS initiative; this ensured 
that its policy plans were reflected in OECD documents.34 
Perhaps owing to the success of the OECD Model, and perhaps 
reflecting the success of other legislative modeling examples, the 
OECD has introduced model legislation as part of the BEPS initiative, 
specifically with respect to new multinational “country by country” 
(CbC) reporting requirements.35 It remains to be seen whether 
OECD model legislation will have the same impact as the OECD 
Model, and whether the OECD will begin to supplement the rules 
 
for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 654 
(2005). The 3,000 figure is an estimate generally agreed among tax law experts to reflect reality. 
 32. See generally Michael Lennard, The UN Model Tax Convention as Compared with the 
OECD Model Tax Convention–Current Points of Difference and Recent Developments, ASIA-
PACIFIC TAX BULLETIN, Jan./Feb. 2009 (describing the origins of and differences between the 
model tax treaties); Reuven Avi-Yonah & Martin Tittle, The New United States Model Income 
Tax Convention, 61 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 224 (2007) (comparing U.S. and OECD 
Model treaties). 
 33. OECD, PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6–2015 FINAL REPORT 11 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN 6], 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315331e.pdf (noting that the OECD 
planned to revise its work on anti-treaty shopping in 2016, pending the adoption by the United 
States of new provisions in the U.S. Model). 
 34. See, e.g., U.S. Proposes Changes to Model Tax Treaty Meant to Influence BEPS Talks, 
BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY TAX REP. (May 21, 2015), http://www.bna.com/us-proposes-
changes-n17179926965; J.P. Finet, U.S. Model Tax Treaty Proposals Were Meant to Influence 
OECD, 148 TAX NOTES 1482 (2015) (reporting that Quyen Huynh, Treasury associate 
international tax counsel, stated that “the LOB approach is the U.S.’s preferred method for 
addressing treaty abuse and that Treasury wanted to influence some of the discussions at the 
OECD with the release of the proposed revisions to the U.S. model treaty”). The U.S. Treasury 
released the new U.S. Model in February 2016, with changes reflecting the extensive comments 
it received on the draft language. Treasury Announces Release of 2016 U.S. Model Income Tax 
Treaty, TREASURY.GOV (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl0356.aspx. For a discussion of some of the new features in the new U.S. Model 
and their connection to the BEPS initiative, see Allison Christians & Alexander Ezenagu, Kill 
Switches in the New U.S. Model Tax Treaty, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1043 (2016). 
 35. See OECD, ACTION 13: COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING IMPLEMENTATION 
PACKAGE 9–13 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 13 IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE], 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/beps-action-13-country-by-country-reporting-
implementation-package.pdf. 
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laid out in the model legislation by regulations laid out in 
commentary, as it has done with the OECD Model. 
Scholars occasionally examine the status of tax norms articulated 
in OECD guidance, especially the commentaries to the OECD 
Model, as a source of authority for tax administrators and courts. 
Experts have long debated whether these declarations are or should 
be viewed by courts as a legitimate source of interpretive authority, 
especially where the bilateral treaty in question is modeled, in whole 
or in part, after the OECD Model.36 Bilateral treaties may be viewed 
in some sense as encompassing unilateral reservations to the OECD 
Model, which thereby takes on some semblance of a de facto 
multilateral treaty. Whether this accurately depicts how a given judicial 
body would view the OECD Model or commentary depends on the 
country and the case.37 
This uncertain legal status allows states to be opportunistic about 
their decision to cooperate or remain autonomous in specific tax policy 
matters. Cooperation appears to be most likely when like nations act 
in like fashion, and when they perceive that doing so will be in their 
long-term interest.38 By aggregating the shared tax priorities of its 
 
 36. See, e.g., Michael Lang & Florian Brugger, The Role of the OECD Commentary in Tax 
Treaty Interpretation, 23 AUSTL. TAX F. 95 (2008); Frank Engelen, Some Observations on the 
Legal Status of the Commentaries on the OECD Model, 60 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 105 (2006); 
David R. Tillinghast, Commentaries to the OECD Model Convention: Ubiquitous, Often 
Controversial; But Could They Possibly Be Legally Binding?, 35 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 580 (2006). 
 37. See, e.g., Canada v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc., [2012] 3 S.C.R. 3, paras. 20–27; Marzen 
Artistic Aluminum Ltd. v. The Queen, [2014] T.C.C. 194, para. 177 (“Canadian courts have 
endorsed the use of the OECD Guidelines. The OECD Guidelines do not have the force of law 
but rather, are intended as tools to assist in determining what a reasonable business person would 
have paid if the parties to a transaction had been dealing with each other at arm’s length.”); 
Taisei Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 104 T.C. 535, 547–48, 550 (1995) 
(citing language in OECD commentaries (1977) as an authoritative source of interpretation for 
a U.S. treaty with Japan, where the relevant provisions mirrored the OECD Model Convention 
(1963) in effect when the treaty was ratified, where the Court sought to “giv[e] effect to the 
intent of the Treaty parties” by “examin[ing] the treaty’s ‘purpose, history and context,’” and 
where the Court noted that the use of the 1977 commentaries was appropriate even though 
adopted later in time because they “reflect[ed] the original intention of the commentary to the 
1963 model”). 
 38. See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD 
IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 51–52 (1984) (“[I]ntergovernmental cooperation takes 
place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as 
facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination.”); 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 553 (2000) (“Self-
regulated cooperation without enforcement by a leviathan is possible . . . when there is a 
commitment ‘to follow the rules so long as (1) most similarly situated individuals adopt the same 
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member states, the OECD provides like nations with an opportunity 
to adopt a uniform approach.39 However, some states might be able 
to ignore or even contradict the agreed norm where defection is 
perceived to be preferable.40 
A major impediment to cooperation in taxation would occur if one 
or more key states could unilaterally withdraw from a particular norm 
without losing its or their status in the network. This occurred with 
the OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices initiative of the late 1990s, from 
which the United States abruptly withdrew its support without 
suffering any exclusion from the ongoing deliberations of the 
OECD.41 As problems become more complex in the implementation 
phase, and the consequences of implementation on differently situated 
states become clearer, some states will be tempted to defect from the 
norm for strategic ends. The network approach can be undermined by 
adverse national acts, by lack of institutional capacity to compel 
compliance, or by a combination thereof. Peer review might add a cost 
to defection to some parties, while having little or no impact 
on others. 
 
commitment and (2) the long-term expected net benefits to be achieved by this strategy are 
greater than the long-term expected net benefits for individuals following short-term 
dominant strategies.’”). 
 39. This may occur in part because “dialogue that enables an issue to be defined as a 
problem constitutes incentives to subscribe to a global regime.” BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, 
supra note 38, at 553. 
 40. See, e.g., Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 
34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 163 (2009) (demonstrating that transnational regulatory networks 
built upon mainly soft law coordination mechanisms are “ill-equipped to effectively address 
enforcement problems,” as illustrated in the case of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, whose 1988 Basel I Accord “gradually unraveled as national regulators adopted 
self-serving exceptions and interpretations because the Committee had little effective leverage 
to enforce its rules,” and in the case of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
whose bilateral securities regulation agreements “painstakingly avoid commitments that would 
bind . . . powers to act against important domestic interests in specific cases”). 
 41. See Andrew Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s 
Campaign against “Harmful Tax Competition”, 4 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 1,  48 (2011) (describing 
the events surrounding the withdrawal of the United States from the Harmful Tax Project 
following the election of George W. Bush to the presidency); Press Release No. PO-366, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary O’Neill Statement on OECD Tax Havens (May 10, 
2001), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po366.aspx  (explaining 
the U.S. Treasury’s decision to “re-evaluate the United States’ participation in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development’s working group that targets ‘harmful 
tax practices’”). 
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C. Peer Review and Monitoring 
The OECD has used peer review over many decades and for many 
purposes, including to assess various states’ fidelity to the OECD’s 
stated tax policy goals.42 Peer review is defined as “an examination of 
one state’s performance or practices in a particular area by other 
states.”43 As an exercise of self-monitoring by agreeing states (rather 
than decrees or mandates issued by a supranational authority), peer 
review serves multiple functions. First, it is a means to publicize 
noncompliance with a previously agreed standard of conduct—a 
function that may have more ability to compel compliance than even 
hard law judicial or quasi-judicial enforcement mechanisms.44 Second, 
peer review may be a source of persuasive authority in achieving 
domestic legal reforms.45 This cuts both ways however; depending on 
the political moods in play, lawmakers may find it useful to use the 
foreign or distant nature of the OECD as a reason to reject 
policy positions. 
Peer review requires countries to agree in advance on the 
parameters of review, which involves drafting “terms of reference” that 
lay out the standards and criteria for evaluation, as well as agreement 
as to the time, manner, place, and outcome of evaluation.46 The 
OECD’s terms of reference for peer review within the Global Forum 
on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 
(Global Forum) are instructive as policy precedent likely to influence 
successive iterations of peer review, and were in use long before the 
BEPS initiative.47 The following table provides an overview of what is 
involved in formulating terms of reference. 
 
 42. For a discussion of the origins, evolving goals, and uses of peer review at the OECD, 
see CARROLL & KELLOW, supra note 17, at 31–34. 
 43. Id. at 31. 
 44. Id. at 5; see also Verdier, supra note 40, at 167–68 (discussing the prospects for 
cooperation in non-binding transnational regulatory networks). 
 45. The OECD’s Peer Review Process: A Tool for Co-Operation and Change, OECD.ORG, 
https://www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (“[R]ecommendations 
resulting from [peer] review can . . . help governments win support at home for 
difficult measures.”). 
 46. See OECD, TERMS OF REFERENCE TO MONITOR AND REVIEW PROGRESS TOWARDS 
TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES 2 (2010) [hereinafter 
2010 EOI TERMS OF REFERENCE], http://www.oecd.org/ctp/44824681.pdf; ACTION 14 
TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 5. 
 47. See generally The OECD’s Peer Review Process, supra note 45; OECD, 2016 TERMS 
OF REFERENCE TO MONITOR AND REVIEW PROGRESS TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY AND 
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Table 1: Elements of Peer Review: Information Exchange 
Within the Global Forum 




Foreseeably relevant tax information must be available 
and accessible to tax authorities; there must be a 
“legal basis for . . . exchange.”48 
Methodology “Peer Review Group assessors shall determine if the 
access powers in a given jurisdiction cover the right 
types of persons and information and whether rights 






2002 OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of 
information in tax matters; OECD Model Tax 
Convention Art. 26 and Commentaries thereto; 2005 
Report of the Joint Ad Hoc Group on Accounts; 
2006 OECD and 2013 Global Forum Manuals on 
Information Exchange; 2004 Guidance Notes 
developed by the OECD Forum on Harmful Tax 
Practices; FATF Recommendations and guidance on 
transparency and beneficial ownership; Global Forum 
Guide on the protection of confidentiality of 
information exchanged for tax purposes.50 
Schedule of 
Review 
Two phase process; “Phase 1 Reviews: The legal and 
regulatory framework”;51 “Phase 2: Monitoring and 








EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON REQUEST FOR TAX PURPOSES (2016) [hereinafter 2016 EOI 
TERMS OF REFERENCE], https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-
forum/publications/terms-of-reference.pdf. 
 48. 2010 EOI TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 46, at 14. 
 49. Id. at 6. 
 50. Id. at 2–3. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 10. 
 53. 2016 EOI TERMS OF Reference, supra note 47, at 9. 
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Terms of reference and statements of assessment methodology 
provide a higher level of detail and reflect more clearly the intentions 
of the agreeing parties as to the meaning of previously agreed 
standards. As will become clearer in the context of the BEPS initiative, 
the real work of OECD norm implementation thus occurs in the 
setting of the terms of reference and assessment method.54 At that 
stage, ambiguities previously accepted for the sake of achieving 
consensus must finally be articulated as workable rules that can be 
applied consistently across countries and yield to comparative analysis. 
Assigning items to peer review is a clarifying and norm-hardening 
exercise. In particular, the assignment of OECD norms to peer review 
offers the OECD an opportunity to refer to its own non-binding 
models and guidance as a “legal basis” for determining how tax 
information exchange is to take place among countries.55 
The BEPS initiative thus represents a cycle of reformulation of the 
hybrid hard and soft law international tax order. The recent cycle of 
cooperation in taxation among OECD member states has also 
extended to key international organizations, which have worked both 
independently and cooperatively in the past to make their own distinct 
imprints on global tax norms.56 Most recently, the international 
 
 54. See, e.g., OECD, MAKING DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE, 
ACTION 14–2015 FINAL REPORT 38 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN 14], 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/making-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective-action-14-
2015-final-report-9789264241633-en.htm (“The core documents for the peer monitoring 
process will be the Terms of Reference and the Assessment Methodology. The Terms of Reference 
will be based on the elements of the minimum standard . . . and will break down these elements 
into specific aspects against which jurisdictions’ legal frameworks, MAP programme guidance 
and actual implementation of the minimum standard are assessed. The Terms of Reference will 
provide a clear roadmap for the monitoring process and will thereby ensure that the assessment 
of all jurisdictions is consistent and complete. The Assessment Methodology will establish detailed 
procedures and guidelines for peer monitoring of OECD and G20 countries and other 
committed jurisdictions by the FTA MAP Forum (see element 1.6 of the minimum standard) 
and will include a system for assessing the implementation of the minimum standard.”). 
 55. See, e.g., 2016 EOI TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 47, at 12. 
 56. For example, the influence of the IMF on tax policy in lower-income countries, 
especially in the preference for consumption taxation, is well known and has been relatively well-
studied in the tax literature. See generally Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: 
The Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139 
(2003); Miranda Stewart & Sunita Jogarajan, The International Monetary Fund and Tax 
Reform, 2 BRIT. TAX REV. 146 (2004). Conversely, the emergent influence of non-government 
organizations, such as Oxfam, Action Aid, and the Tax Justice Network, has only more recently 
come to the attention of tax policy scholars. See e.g., Allison Christians, Tax Activists and the 
Global Movement for Development Through Transparency, in TAX, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 288, 
290–92 (Miranda Stewart & Yariv Brauner eds., 2013). 
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organizations announced their development of a “Platform for 
Collaboration” on tax among the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank, 
and the United Nations.57 In this new era of cooperation among 
governments and international organizations, “the OECD will lead 
the work on building and implementing” global implementation of 
tax policy norms, “based on [its] comparative advantages and 
capabilities.”58 Accordingly, the OECD is using its BEPS initiative to 
build upon its history as the locus of global fiscal policy development. 
II. NORM DEVELOPMENT: FOUR MINIMUM STANDARDS 
The BEPS initiative is poised to be a pivotal turning point in the 
iterative policy cycle of the international tax order. Within a very short 
time, the OECD articulated its view of the various elements of BEPS, 
arranged for detailed study in working parties, and developed 
consultation drafts and processes to engage relevant stakeholders—
governments, taxpayers, and practitioners, as well as academics and 
other nongovernmental observers.59 Many, but not all, of the 
stakeholders are professionals in tax, accounting, or economics. The 
vast majority are professionals from the government and legal sector; 
academics, independent researchers, and nongovernmental 
organizations are also represented but more thinly spread.60 Many of 
the stakeholders focused primarily on the technical aspects of the 
BEPS reforms, but many also focused on broader policy questions.61 
 
 57. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ET AL., THE PLATFORM FOR COLLABORATION 
ON TAX: CONCEPT NOTE 1, 3 (2016), https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/
pdf/pr16176.pdf. 
 58. Id. at 5, 8. 
 59. Work on BEPS officially began in June 2012 with an announcement by the G20 in 
support of the initiative. G20, supra note 2, at 1, 9. By February of 2013, the OECD released 
its initial report, identifying the fifteen action item areas and setting a “rapid” timeline of as little 
as twelve months for delivery of action items. OECD 2013 BEPS REPORT, supra note 2, at 24 
(stating tautologically that “[t]he pace of the project must be rapid so that concrete actions can 
be delivered quickly,” and laying out the expectation that “the Action Plan will largely be 
completed in a two-year period, recognising that some actions will be addressed faster as work 
has already been advanced, while others might require longer-term work”). 
 60. The OECD reports that over 1,400 submissions were received during the BEPS 
initiative from industry, advisers, NGOs, and academics. ACTION PLAN 15, supra note 4, at 3. 
 61. See OECD, Comments Received on Public Discussion Draft: BEPS Action 15, 
Development of a Multilateral Instrument to Implement the Tax Treaty Related BEPS Measures 
(June 30, 2016), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/public-comments-received-discussion-
draft-Development-of-MLI-to-Implement-Tax-Treaty-related-BEPS-Measures.pdf (providing a 
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Stakeholders varied broadly in terms of geographic and cultural 
origins, and encompassed a broad spectrum of political leanings 
and goals.62 
Given that the OECD is a consensus-building network, the 
organization generally lacks the power to mandate domestic legal 
changes within its member states, let alone non-member states.63 Nor 
can it accurately describe its consensus positions as a record of 
promises made by member states to each other, absent a signed 
multilateral treaty to that effect. Instead, the OECD uses language of 
expectation and aspiration.64 However, the OECD does perform a 
function that moves states toward common undertakings, namely, by 
expressing claims on behalf of its member states about agreements 
they have made to move in concert toward a stated regulatory goal.65 
In the absence of agreement on enforcement backed by sanctions, 
the good faith of the parties in carrying out mutually agreed policy 
choices appears to be the main force driving these claims to outcomes. 
Peer monitoring may help clarify ambiguities, highlight deviations 
from expectations, and lead to another cycle of bargaining. On the 
other hand, it may also lead to lowered standards in the name of 
convenience, expediency, diplomacy, or otherwise.66 
 
compilation of the submissions received by the OECD in response to its request for input of 
May 2016). 
 62. Id. 
 63. However, the OECD Council occasionally adopts international agreements to which 
member states are bound unless they enter reservations. For an example, see Econ. and Dev. 
Review Comm., Mandate, https://www.oecd.org/site/ecoedrc/mandate.htm (last modified 
May 4, 2009). 
 64. See, e.g., OECD 2013 BEPS REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that its “international 
standards” have sought to address tax coordination problems “in a way that respects tax 
sovereignty” and that “[c]ountries have long worked and are strongly committed to 
eliminate . . . double taxation in order to minimise trade distortions and impediments to 
sustainable economic growth, while affirming their sovereign right to establish their own 
tax rules”). 
 65. See, e.g., ACTION 14 TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 5, at 5 (“This report contains 
a commitment by countries to implement a minimum standard to ensure that they resolve treaty-
related disputes in a timely, effective and efficient manner. All members of the inclusive 
framework on BEPS (‘Members’) commit to the implementation of the Action 14 minimum 
standard and to have their implementation reviewed pursuant to the Terms of Reference and 
Assessment Methodology agreed by Members.”) 
 66. See, e.g., Verdier, supra note 40, at 171 (noting that transnational regulatory networks 
“can effectively solve some, but not all, problems of international regulatory cooperation,” and, 
“[i]n particular, [they] are unlikely to be effective in areas that raise significant distributive or 
enforcement problems”). 
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The OECD produced action plans on fifteen items in the BEPS 
initiative, of which several contain minimum standards designed for 
either unilateral or bilateral country-level implementation. Other 
action items include changes to the OECD Model and guidance, as 
well as undertakings to engage in further dialogue and agreement.67 
The OECD organized its minimum standards into four categories: 
Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting, tax treaty abuse, harmful tax 
practices, and cross-border tax dispute resolution.68 Each minimum 
standard is laid out as a prescriptive rule accompanied by various 
recommendations and best practices. This Part examines the four 
minimum standards in turn and considers how accompanying 
recommendations will develop into more minimum standards over 
time by being embedded in OECD models and guidance, being 
subject to peer review, or both. 
A. CbC Reporting 
A main driver of the BEPS initiative has been the desire of many 
OECD members to reconfigure how states place boundaries around 
the tax planning of major multinational corporations. The OECD’s 
adoption of CbC reporting for this purpose is a momentous event, 
clearly occasioned by the work of international tax justice advocacy 
groups.69 The core idea of CbC reporting is that multinational 
companies should disclose how much tax they pay in each country in 
which they operate, and that every country in which a multinational 
 
 67. Some of the action items provide for actions to be executed by governments internally 
or in the future, while others do not directly call for governmental response with a minimum 
standard, recommendation, or best practice. The latter include: OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX 
CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1–2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter 
ACTION PLAN 1], http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315281e.pdf; OECD, 
MEASURING AND MONITORING BEPS, ACTION 11–2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter 
ACTION PLAN 11], http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315361e.pdf; 
OECD, MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULES, ACTION 12–2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) 
[hereinafter ACTION PLAN 12], http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/231
5371e.pdf; ACTION PLAN 14, supra note 54; and ACTION PLAN 15, supra note 4. 
 68. BEPS-Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6, at 3. 
 69. For an analysis of how these groups made their policy goals the subject of OECD 
attention, see Christians, supra note 56, at 290–92 (describing the push for country-by-country 
reporting as an outgrowth of international efforts by nongovernment organizations to shed light 
on corruption in the natural resources sector with the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative). 
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company operates should have equal access to the information of the 
MNE group.70 
Tax justice advocacy groups have consistently called for CbC 
disclosure to be public.71 The rationale is that public scrutiny is a 
necessary check on an otherwise obscure global system in which 
governments accept and even facilitate the means by which 
multinationals strategically assign their incomes geographically in 
order to avoid paying tax.72 In contrast, the OECD has limited CbC 
reporting to governments, and attached strict use and confidentiality 
limitations.73 Not only must governments keep CbC reports they 
receive from taxpayers or from other governments confidential from 
both the public and even other agencies or departments within the 
government, but they may not use these reports, without more, to 
challenge specific taxpayers regarding their transfer pricing positions.74 
The OECD’s version of CbC reporting is thus intended to provide 
states with a diagnostic tool that may trigger an audit process. It will 
also generate more data and information that may aid in future tax-
policy making with respect to multinationals, depending on the degree 
of confidentiality, which is under vigorous debate. Many experts 
believe that public disclosure of CbC reports is only a matter of time, 
especially as the European Union has already proposed that certain 
CbC reports be made public.75 Until that proposal is adopted, 
 
 70. See id. 
 71. See RICHARD MURPHY, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY 
REPORTING: SHINING LIGHT ONTO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 3–4 (2010), http://www. 
taxresearch.org.uk/Documents/CBCDec2010.pdf (listing reasons for public disclosure, 
including serving the interests of shareholders and the broader public). 
 72. Id.  
 73. OECD, ACTION 13: GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSFER PRICING 
DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING 5–6 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 
13 GUIDANCE], https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-action-13-guidance-implementation-tp-
documentation-cbc-reporting.pdf (outlining confidentiality, consistency, and appropriate use as 
conditions to obtaining and using CbC reports). 
 74. Id.; ACTION 13 IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE, supra note 35, at 13 (including 
appropriate use and confidentiality in model legislation); id. at 19 (including appropriate use and 
confidentiality in a multilateral agreement to govern information exchange). In addition, the 
Action 13 Implementation Package contains a lengthy confidentiality and data safeguards 
questionnaire to “ensure the confidentiality of exchanged tax information and limit its use to 
appropriate purposes.” Id. at 23. 
 75. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending 
Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Income Tax Information by Certain Undertakings 
and Branches, at 2, COM (2016) 198 final (Apr. 12, 2016) (stating that “greater transparency 
on the side of companies is needed to enable public scrutiny of whether tax is paid where profits 
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governments would, under current OECD standards, impose 
requirements on firms and share reports with each other 
according  to  international agreements subject to multiple 
confidentiality assurances.76 
The minimum standard for CbC involves three parts: (1) domestic 
adoption of procedures for a three-tiered reporting system of three 
documents, consisting of the master file, local file, and CbC report; 
(2) adoption of the necessary international agreements and 
procedures to automatically exchange CbC reports; and (3) 
submission to periodic OECD monitoring.77 The OECD is 
operationalizing each of these parts with a combination of interrelated 
hard and soft law instruments that build upon and reinforce one 
another, further ensuring that the OECD will continue to have a 
central role in setting and policing tax policy norm development and 
compliance in this area. In particular, the OECD has: 
• issued model CbC reporting legislation suitable for 
adoption by lawmakers;78 
• drafted model competent authority agreements to 
facilitate the consistent exchange of information based 
on existing double tax conventions and tax 
information exchange agreements (TIEAs), which are 
themselves based on OECD models;79 
• developed “rules” for electronic gathering, sorting, 
and transmission of CbC Reports;80 
 
are produced” and that “[t]his proposal requires that MNEs disclose publicly in a specific report 
the income tax they pay together with other relevant tax-related information”). 
 76. The CbC regime may also imply accepting some new technical rules (generally to be 
applied through the Transfer Pricing Guidelines). See ACTION 13 GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 
5; ACTION 13 IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE, supra note 35, at 12. 
 77. See ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, at 37–69. 
 78. ACTION 13 IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE, supra note 35, at 9–13. 
 79. Id. at 31; Country-by-Country Reporting, OECD.ORG, https://www.oecd.org/tax/
automatic-exchange/about-automatic-exchange/country-by-country-reporting.htm (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2016). 
 80. OECD, COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING XML SCHEMA: USER GUIDE FOR TAX 
ADMINISTRATIONS AND TAXPAYERS 3 (2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/country-by-country-
reporting-xml-schema-user-guide-for-tax-administrations-and-taxpayers.pdf (describing its 
contents as a “common template” of “rules regarding transfer pricing documentation” that were 
prepared in accordance with the “requirements” of Action 13). 
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• drafted a multilateral competent authority agreement 
(CbC MCAA) to further facilitate consistent 
information exchange;81 
• tied the CbC MCAA to an existing OECD-initiated 
agreement, the Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters (MAATM);82 and 
• tied CbC reporting to peer review via the 
Inclusive Framework.83 
CbC appears to be a top priority for BEPS implementation. The 
origin of this focus is likely attributable to NGOs, which pressured 
OECD countries to significantly change the ways in which they gather 
and share tax information related to the conduct of multinationals in 
the hopes that transparency will bring about substantive legal reform. 
With multinational tax planning increasingly being featured in 
print and online media as aggressive and abusive “tax dodging,” and 
 
 81. This agreement is in turn based on (in the OECD’s words, “inspired by”) the 
OECD’s Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of Financial 
Account Information (CRS MCAA), which was “concluded in the context of the 
implementation of the Common Reporting Standard,” another OECD regime. Country-by-
Country Reporting, supra note 79. The international agreements to facilitate the consistent 
implementation of tax information exchange could serve as a case study on the incremental use 
of the OECD to crystallize the tax policy preferences of its key member states. See 
OECD,  TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTY REPORTING, 
ACTION 13–2015 FINAL REPORT 10 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing-
documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting-action-13-2015-final-report-97892642414
80-en.htm (“Consistent and effective implementation of the transfer pricing documentation 
standards and in particular of the Country-by-Country Report is essential.”). 
 82. As the OECD explains, the MAATM requires its parties to mutually agree on the 
scope of and procedures for automatic exchange of tax information; the CbC MCAA is one 
mechanism to achieve that mutual agreement. See OECD, supra note 79. As of the end of 
November 2016, the MAATM had 107 signatories. Jurisdictions Participating in the Convention 
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, Status–21 November 2016, OECD.ORG 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2016). As of October 21, 2016, the CbC MCAA had 49 signatories. Signatories 
of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-By-Country 
Reports, Status as of 21 October 2016, OECD.ORG, https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-
exchange/about-automatic-exchange/CbC-MCAA-Signatories.pdf (last visited Nov. 
27, 2016). 
 83. ACTION 13 IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE, supra note 35, at 5, 17; see also BEPS-
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6 (“Mechanisms will be developed to monitor 
jurisdictions’ compliance with their commitments and to monitor the effectiveness of the filing 
and dissemination mechanisms. The outcomes of this monitoring will be taken into 
consideration in thorough review planned for 2020, which will also reassess whether 
modifications are required to the content of the reports.”). 
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public reaction accordingly intensifying,84 national legislators and 
policymakers in key states seem to have viewed the OECD as well-
positioned to respond.85 CbC delivery will occur through multiple 
mechanisms, and will likely be a focus for ongoing norm development. 
Related to the minimum standard for CbC reporting, the OECD 
makes a number of recommendations related to transfer pricing rules, 
which is an issue area of major significance for states and for the 
international tax community.86 Most, if not all, of the OECD’s 
recommendations on transfer pricing will be deployed in revised 
transfer pricing guidelines, which OECD members and BEPS 
Associates are expected to respect.87 Some countries have incorporated 
the transfer pricing guidelines into national legislation.88 Among these 
countries, the revised guidelines may need to be explicitly 
 
 84. See, e.g., The Tax Dodging Bill Campaign, TAXDODGINGBILL.ORG, 
http://taxdodgingbill.org.uk/home/index.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2016); Corporate Tax 
Dodging, OXFAM.ORG, https://www.oxfam.org/en/tags/corporate-tax-dodging (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2016); Jesse Drucker, Occupy Wall Street Stylists Tap into Public Rage Over Corporate 
Tax Dodgers, FIN. POST (June 11, 2013, 9:44 AM), http://business.financialpost.com/
news/economy/uk-uncut-taxes-corporate; How to Stop Tax Dodging, ACTIONAID.ORG, 
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/102021/how_to_stop_tax_dodging.html (last visited Nov. 23, 
2016); Lynnley Browning, Insight: Microsoft Use of Low-Tax Havens Drives Down Tax Bill, 
REUTERS (July 27, 2011, 7:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/us-
microsoft-tax-idUSTRE76Q6OB20110727; see also Christians, supra note 56, at 297–98 
(outlining efforts of tax activists to tie cuts in social programs to the tax affairs of 
multinational companies). 
 85. OECD 2013 BEPS REPORT, supra note 2, at 8, 11 (explaining the origin of the 
OECD’s BEPS initiative as a response to “developments [that] have opened up opportunities 
for MNEs to greatly minimise their tax burden,” which “has led to a tense situation in which 
citizens have become more sensitive to tax fairness issues,” and stating that “[i]t has become a 
critical issue for all parties” and that “[t]he G20 finance ministers called on the OECD to develop 
an action plan to address BEPS issues in a co-ordinated and comprehensive manner”); see also 
G20, supra note 2, at 9 (affirming its support for the OECD to undertake its work on BEPS). 
 86. See OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, 
ACTIONS 8-10–2015 FINAL REPORTS 9 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN 8-10], 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315351e.pdf. 
 87. See OECD, OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS 20–22 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
pricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm. 
 88. See ERNST & YOUNG, WORLDWIDE TRANSFER PRICING REFERENCE GUIDE 2015–
16, at 26, 125, 228, 331 (2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-
Worldwide-transfer-pricing-reference-guide-2015-16/$File/EY_Worldwide_Transfer_Pricing
_Reference_Guide_2015-16.pdf (explaining that OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have been 
explicitly incorporated in domestic laws in some countries, including, inter alia, Australia, 
Germany, and Ukraine, while they have been deemed to be relevant or appropriate sources of 
interpretation in others, including, inter alia, Namibia). 
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incorporated, while in others the revised guidelines may be 
incorporated by reference. Whether the current or revised transfer 
pricing guidelines serve as legal or persuasive authority in a court of 
law is a distinct issue. The OECD’s main recommendations with 
respect to transfer pricing are for countries to:89 
• revise allocation rules to attribute risks to related 
parties on the basis of control and financial capacity;90 
• revise allocation rules to prevent legal ownership as the 
sole determinant of source of income attributed 
to intangibles;91 
• revise allocation rules to attribute value to companies 
that perform important functions;92 
• limit non-controlling companies to risk-free return or 
less on financial transactions;93 and 
• limit values attributed to group synergy to companies 
contributing to synergistic benefits.94 
The OECD expects its guidance in this area, in particular the 
commentary and the transfer pricing guidelines themselves, to serve 
“as the basis for legislation in OECD countries and an increasing 
number of non-OECD economies.”95 Past experience has taught the 
 
 89. See ACTION PLAN 8-10, supra note 86, at 53–54 (describing revisions to OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines). 
 90. Id. at 10 (“[R]isks contractually assumed by a party that cannot in fact exercise 
meaningful and specifically defined control over the risks, or does not have the financial capacity 
to assume the risks, will be allocated to the party that does exercise such control and does have 
the financial capacity to assume the risks.”). 
 91. Id. (“[L]egal ownership alone does not necessarily generate a right to all (or indeed 
any) of the return that is generated by the exploitation of the intangible.”). 
 92. Id. (“The group companies performing important functions, controlling 
economically significant risks and contributing assets, as determined through the accurate 
delineation of the actual transaction, will be entitled to an appropriate return reflecting the value 
of their contributions.”). 
 93. Id. at 11 (“If [an] associated enterprise does not in fact control the financial risks 
associated with its funding (for example because it just provides the money when it is asked to 
do so, without any assessment of whether the party receiving the money is creditworthy), then 
it will not be allocated the profits associated with the financial risks and will be entitled to no 
more than a risk-free return, or less if, for example, the transaction is not commercially rational 
and therefore the guidance on non-recognition applies.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. OECD, OECD’S CURRENT TAX AGENDA 10 (2012), https://www.oecd.org/tax/
OECDCurrentTaxAgenda2012.pdf. For a discussion of the implications of this kind of 
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OECD the value of such guidance, so it is unsurprising that the 
architecture of BEPS implementation with respect to transfer pricing 
features multiple overlapping methods with guidance as the central 
unifying feature. Indeed, OECD guidance is expressly intended to 
serve as a means to achieve convergence on a longer time scale for 
items that were not susceptible to immediate consensus during the 
initial BEPS bargaining. For example, the OECD states: 
In addition [to the four minimum standards], existing standards 
have been updated and will be implemented, noting however that 
not all BEPS participants have endorsed the underlying standards on 
tax treaties or transfer pricing. In other areas, such as 
recommendations on hybrid mismatch arrangements and best 
practices on interest deductibility, countries have agreed a general 
tax policy direction. In these areas, they are expected to converge 
over time through the implementation of the agreed common 
approaches, thus enabling further consideration of whether such 
measures should become minimum standards in the future. 
Guidance based on best practices will also support countries 
intending to act in the areas of mandatory disclosure initiatives or 
CFC legislation.96 
Because the transfer pricing guidelines are still under negotiation 
at the OECD, the level of detail for the various recommendations and 
related prescriptions remains to be seen. However, given the inherent 
difficulties of clarifying the arm’s length standard, it is expected that 
the current BEPS initiative will not close the matter of transfer pricing 
as an issue but will merely highlight new areas for further contestation 
and re-negotiation going forward. NGO pressure to move away from 
the arm’s length standard in favor of some form of combined 
reporting with formulary apportionment may intensify if the post-
BEPS consensus fails to relieve perceived problems with the 
administration of transfer pricing by lower-income countries. 
B. Harmful Tax Practices 
The second issue area for which the OECD has articulated a 
minimum standard is a continuation of an initiative that the OECD 
has been developing since the late 1990s, namely, addressing the 
 
“globalized localism,” see BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON 
SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 177–82 (2d ed. 2002). 
 96. BEPS-Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6. 
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problem of tax competition.97 As the OECD discovered in its early 
work on this subject, there is inconsistent consensus among countries 
regarding what constitutes acceptable versus non-acceptable tax 
competition, and what to do about the latter.98 Impasse on the matter 
is likely because all countries engage in tax competition to some 
degree or another, but some use more sophisticated and less 
transparent mechanisms than others.99 
The OECD’s effort to address harmful tax practices is articulated 
as a quest to develop a “level playing field,” upon which countries may 
use their tax systems to attract inward investment, but only to the 
extent such efforts are aimed at “real” investment as opposed to paper 
profits allocated to shell companies with little or no ascertainable 
operations in the host country.100 Ongoing efforts to identify targeted 
country practices rather than singling out countries themselves 
became a necessity after the OECD’s efforts in the 1990s appeared to 
focus on small, non-OECD countries while overlooking the 
contributions of its own membership to the overall phenomenon of 
harmful tax competition.101 
While the focus on non-member states remains difficult to 
overcome, Action 5 expresses a commitment by OECD member states 
(and by extension, BEPS Associates) to counter harmful tax practices 
in general.102 However, the minimum standard specifically calls for 
states to undertake two commitments. The first is to align domestic 
legal or administrative practices to a single standard, namely, the use 
of a “nexus approach” for allocating the income from 
intellectual property.103 
 
 97. For a discussion and analysis of the original harmful tax practices initiative, see Allison 
Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 99 (2009). 
 98. Id. at 116–20. 
 99. See, e.g., PETER DIETSCH, CATCHING CAPITAL: THE ETHICS OF TAX COMPETITION 
80, 94–103 (2015) (categorizing forms of tax competition, with practices to be defined as 
unacceptable according to a combination of their intent and outcome, and explaining that “[a]ny 
fiscal policy of a state is unjust and should be prohibited if it is both strategically motivated and 
has a negative impact on the aggregate fiscal self-determination of other states”). 
 100. OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON TAXATION, A PROCESS FOR ACHIEVING A GLOBAL 
LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 2 (2004), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/31967501.pdf. 
 101. Christians, supra note 97, at 115. 
 102. OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING 
INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5–2015 FINAL REPORT 3–4 (2015) 
[hereinafter ACTION PLAN 5], http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/
2315321e.pdf. 
 103. Id. at 67. 
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The nexus rule is, simply stated, the OECD’s compromise 
position on the so-called “patent box” incentive regimes, which are 
an increasingly popular form of tax competition across OECD 
member states.104 Patent box regimes are not necessarily consistent 
with past OECD definitions of non-harmful tax practices, so the 
OECD’s inclusion of a nexus rule in the BEPS initiative may be seen 
as a minor step, if any step at all, in combatting harmful tax practices. 
Under this minimum standard, tax authorities that grant 
preferential tax treatment for intellectual property-related income via 
administrative rulings are to exchange such rulings, subject to peer 
review, but there are no penalties or prohibitions to be imposed in the 
event countries deviate from the nexus-based minimum standard.105 
Moreover, the nexus standard itself is yet to be settled, with some 
countries interpreting nexus in a manner that is or may be inconsistent 
with that of others.106 
Relatedly, states committed to use agreed grandfathering rules if 
modifications to their intellectual property tax regimes will include 
transition rules.107 The OECD is also developing the means to 
spontaneously exchange six types of administrative rulings: 
• rulings related to preferential regimes; 
 
 104. See, e.g., ROBERT ATKINSON AND SCOTT ANDES, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION 
FOUND., PATENT BOXES: INNOVATION IN TAX POLICY AND TAX POLICY FOR INNOVATION 5 
(2011), http://www.itif.org/files/2011-patent-box-final.pdf (listing countries that have 
adopted patent box regimes and describing major features thereof). 
 105. ACTION PLAN 5, supra note 102, at 45–60 (detailing plan for ruling exchange). 
 106. The type of nexus rule in the new U.S. Model is illustrative as it may conflict with 
European Union case law, which has held that countries may not provide research and 
development credits conditioned on the location of the research and development in a particular 
state, owing to EU rules on the free movement of capital. See, e.g., Case C-39/04, Laboratoires 
Fournier SA v Direction des vérifications nationales et internationals, 2005 E.C.R. I-2068, I-
2076 (“Article 49 EC precludes legislation of a Member State which restricts the benefit of a tax 
credit for research only to research carried out in that Member State.”). 
 107. Accordingly, countries with existing patent box rules that are deemed to be 
inconsistent with the BEPS Action Plan may choose to include transition rules to delay 
implementation of the rules necessary to become compliant with the minimum standard, but 
only with respect to firms already eligible for the existing patent box regime. This is the case 
with respect to the United Kingdom, for example. Its existing patent box regime is grandfathered 
until June 30, 2021 for firms that were in the regime prior to July 1, 2016. See HM Revenue & 
Customs, Corporation Tax: Patent Box - Compliance with New International Rules, GOV.UK 
(Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/corporation-tax-patent-box-
compliance-with-new-international-rules/corporation-tax-patent-box-compliance-with-new-
international-rules. 
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• cross border unilateral advance pricing arrangements 
(APAs) or other unilateral transfer pricing rulings; 
• rulings giving a downward adjustment to profits; 
• permanent establishment (PE) rulings; 
• conduit rulings; and 
• any other type of ruling where the Global Forum 
agrees in the future that the absence of exchange 
would give rise to BEPS concerns.108 
Related to the minimum standard are the following 
recommendations, most or all of which will be operationalized 
through OECD guidance, revisions to the OECD Model, or inclusion 
in a multilateral agreement: 
• implement and apply hybrid mismatch rules in 
accordance with policy objectives of the Action 
2 report;109 
• undertake internal periodic “review of the operation 
of the [hybrid mismatch] rules as necessary to 
determine whether they are operating as intended”;110 
• make information about hybrid mismatch exchange 
procedures available to taxpayers;111 
• undergo periodic OECD monitoring of interest 
deduction limitation rules according to a 
 
 108. ACTION PLAN 5, supra note 102, at 47–51. 
 109. Action Plan 2 calls on countries to preserve “the underlying policy objectives of the 
report.” OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, 
ACTION 2–2015 FINAL REPORT 94 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN 2], http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315291e.pdf. This includes:  
(a) agree guidance on how the rules ought to be applied; (b) co-ordinate 
implementation on the rules (primarily as to timing); (c) agree how the rules should 
apply to existing instruments and entities that are caught by the rules when they are 
first introduced (i.e. transitional arrangements); (d) undertake a review of the 
operation of the rules as necessary to determine whether they are operating as 
intended; (e) agree procedures for exchanging information on the domestic tax 
treatment of instruments and entities in order to assist tax administrations in applying 
their rules to hybrid mismatch arrangements within their jurisdiction; (f) endeavour 
to make such information available to taxpayers; and (g) provide further commentary 
on the interaction between the recommendations in the report and the other Items 
in the BEPS Action Plan (OECD, 2013). 
Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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process  to  be  determined (presumably in the 
Inclusive Framework);112 
• adopt procedures to inform the Global Forum if tax 
benefits are provided to specified intellectual 
property assets;113 
• adopt measures to monitor and gather data on 
companies benefitting from tax regimes that 
are  designed to promote development in 
disadvantaged areas;114 
• adopt procedures to spontaneously exchange statistical 
information with respect to specified intellectual 
property-related rulings;115 and 
• adopt procedures to spontaneously exchange statistical 
information with respect to cases of insufficient 
intellectual property-ruling related data gathering 
and exchange.116  
It seems clear that countering harmful tax practices involves a 
complex, yet abstract, list of items and issues that do not yet appear to 
have full consensus among the BEPS constituency at that level of fine 
detail. The only item of clear consensus is a nexus rule that itself has 
yet to be clarified in a manner capable of consistent implementation 
across OECD member states and BEPS Associates. The future use of 
 
 112. OECD, LIMITING BASE EROSION INVOLVING INTEREST DEDUCTIONS AND OTHER 
FINANCIAL PAYMENTS, ACTION 4–2015 FINAL REPORT 13 (2015), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315311e.pdf (“A co-ordinated implementation of the 
recommended approach will successfully impact on [sic] the ability of multinational groups to 
use debt to achieve BEPS outcomes. To ensure the recommended approach remains effective in 
tackling BEPS involving interest, the implementation, operation and impact of the approach will 
be monitored over time, to allow for a comprehensive and informed review as necessary.”). 
 113. ACTION PLAN 5, supra note 102, at 67. 
 114. Id. (“[S]ome regimes designed to promote development in disadvantaged areas will 
need to be monitored and that countries will be required to keep data on the companies 
benefitting from those regimes.”). 
 115. Id. at 68 (“[C]ountries that provide taxpayer-specific rulings that fall within the 
framework will be expected to provide statistical information that includes the following: (i) the 
total number of spontaneous exchanges sent under the framework, (ii) the number of 
spontaneous exchanges sent by category of ruling, and (iii) for each exchange, [the names of 
the] country or countries [with which information was exchanged].”). 
 116. Id. (“Countries should also provide details of the cases where they had insufficient 
information to identify all the countries that they needed to exchange with and therefore applied 
a best efforts approach. This information should be broken down by category of ruling and 
should include a brief description of the efforts undertaken to identify relevant related parties.”). 
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guidance and peer review, particularly in the absence of a standard, 
will likely reveal the path forward. Presumably, several of these issues 
will beget more concrete standards when the OECD undertakes its 
planned BEPS reassessment phase in 2020.117 
C. Tax Treaty Abuse 
The third issue area for which the OECD has articulated a 
minimum standard is in addressing the problem of abuses of the 
bilateral tax treaty system, which, as introduced above,118 can result in 
gaps between tax jurisdictions that lead to double non-taxation. While 
some gaps are intentionally created by states seeking inward 
investment, the phrase “tax treaty abuse” is generally used to connote 
planning by taxpayers that was in some fashion not intended (or is no 
longer accepted) by the parties to the affected treaties.119 The OECD 
proposes to counter these gaps by revising the terms of treaties 
going forward.120 
The minimum standard in this area involves an optional menu: (1) 
adoption in all new treaties (as well as the new OECD Model and the 
MLI) (2) a principle purpose test alone, (3) a principal purpose test 
combined with a limitation on benefits provision, or (4) a limitation 
on benefits provision combined with a specified anti-conduit rule.121 
It is not yet clear what will happen if countries take inconsistent 
positions in their bilateral treaties. Nor is it clear how a multilateral 
treaty works with an array of options for the signatories. 
Additional mainly treaty-based BEPS recommendations related to 
treaty abuses include the following: 
• address hybrid mismatches in accordance with 
revisions to Article 1 of the OECD Model;122 
• include an express statement about a common 
intention to eliminate double taxation without 
 
 117. See, e.g., ACTION 13 GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 3; ACTION PLAN 5, supra note 
102, at 27; ACTION PLAN 8-10, supra note 86, at 64. 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 23–25. 
 119. See Richard L. Reinhold, What It Tax Treaty Abuse? (Is Treaty Shopping an Outdated 
Concept?), 53 TAX LAW. 663, 672–83 (2000). 
 120. See generally ACTION PLAN 6, supra note 33. 
 121. Id. at 9–10. 
 122. See generally ACTION PLAN 2, supra note 109. 
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creating double non-taxation or treaty shopping 
opportunities;123 and 
• include a saving clause to preserve domestic taxation 
of residents subject to specified exceptions.124 
There is some overlap of purpose and scope in these minimum 
standards and items to be addressed in updates to the OECD Model 
per other action items, as well as the items to be introduced in the 
MLI, the subject of Action 15. Further clarity should be attained when 
the multilateral treaty is released for signature.125 
D. Cross-Border Dispute Resolution 
The final category of the OECD minimum standards involves 
treaty-based dispute resolution.126 This standard builds upon existing 
provisions in the OECD Model, specifically the “mutual agreement 
procedure” of Article 25.127 The OECD’s goal is to implement 
streamlined mutual agreement procedures to respond to the increase 
in double taxation that is expected to occur as countries adopt anti-
BEPS measures.128 The minimum standard states that countries have 
agreed to do the following: 
 
 123. See ACTION PLAN 6, supra note 33, at 10. The inclusion of this provision in the 
preamble to new treaties appears designed to provide administrators and courts the ability to 
apply general anti-abuse rules to tax treaties, by clarifying the intentions of the parties and 
conveying something about the “spirit” of the text. 
 124. Id. at 86. A saving clause is a provision that prohibits residents of a treaty country 
from using the treaty to reduce their residence-based taxation, thus confining the use of treaties 
to the reduction of tax at source for the benefit of nonresidents.  See U.S. MODEL, supra note 
31, at 2 (article one, paragraph four). The United States includes such a provision in all U.S. tax 
treaties save a very old one, with Pakistan. Convention Between the United States of America 
and Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income, Pak.-U.S., July 1, 1957, 10 U.S.T. 984; see Christians, supra note 
31. However, the use of the saving clause mechanism by the United States is distinct because 
the United States is the only country in the world that taxes individuals as if they are residents 
purely on the basis of citizenship, which may be acquired voluntarily but is also conferred 
automatically by birth and by lineage in many and varied circumstances. Accordingly, the saving 
clause prevents individuals who are citizens and residents of other countries, and who also have 
U.S. person status, from using a U.S. tax treaty to reduce their U.S. tax liability; this would be 
inapposite in any case not involving the United States. A saving clause might be adapted to defeat 
so-called round tripping, but such practices might also be addressed in limitation on benefit and 
other safeguards. 
 125. ACTION PLAN 15, supra note 4, at 3. 
 126. See ACTION PLAN 14, supra note 54, at 13. 
 127. OECD MODEL, supra note 29, at 38–39 (article twenty-five). 
 128. ACTION PLAN 14, supra note 54, at 9. 
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• “[e]nsure that treaty obligations related to the mutual 
agreement procedure are fully implemented in good 
faith and that MAP cases are resolved in a 
timely manner; 
• [e]nsure the implementation of administrative 
processes that promote the prevention and timely 
resolution of treaty-related disputes; and 
• [e]nsure that taxpayers can access the MAP 
when eligible.”129 
Action 14 is careful to distinguish good faith and timely resolution 
under the mutual agreement procedure from any obligation to accept 
binding arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. Although 
binding arbitration is a method preferred by several key countries, 
including the United States, it has not yet risen to the level of 
established consensus. Nevertheless, it is expected to be included in 
the MLI as an optional provision to be elected on an opt-in rather 
than opt-out basis.130 The submission of treaty-based dispute 
resolution to peer monitoring increases the likelihood of exerting 
pressure on countries that do not use arbitration and whose mutual 
agreement procedures may therefore appear to lag behind or be more 
cumbersome than others. 
In addition to the minimum standard, and in connection with peer 
review of country implementation, the OECD calls all countries to 
join the “Forum on Tax Administration MAP Forum” (the FTA MAP 
Forum).131 This redundantly named body had forty-six members at 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. See, e.g., Nathalie Bravo, The Proposal for a Multilateral Tax Instrument for Updating 
Tax Treaties, in BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS): THE PROPOSALS TO REVISE THE 
OECD MODEL CONVENTION 327, 343 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2016). 
 131. ACTION PLAN 14, supra note 54, at 16 (“In light of the objectives of the FTA MAP 
Forum – and, in particular, in view of the role of the FTA MAP Forum in monitoring the 
implementation of the minimum standard set out in this Report . . . countries should become 
members of the FTA MAP Forum and participate fully in its work.”). The OECD’s Forum on 
Tax Administration was formed in 2002. Forum on Tax Administration, supra note 4. It created 
the FTA MAP Forum in 2013. Forum on Tax Admin., FTA Work Programme 2013/14, 
OECD.ORG, https://www.oecd.org/site/ctpfta/ftaworkprogramme201213.htm (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2016); see also Forum on Tax Admin., Multilateral Strategic Plan on Mutual Agreement 
Procedures: A Vision for Continuous Map Improvement, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/
site/ctpfta/map-strategic-plan.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Multilateral 
Strategic Plan] (“The Forum on Tax Administration has determined that competent authorities 
from among the FTA-member countries shall form a forum (the FTA MAP Forum) to meet 
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the time the Action 14 Report was issued.132 While details have not yet 
been formally released, it appears that countries that elect to become 
BEPS Associates will simultaneously become members of the various 
tax-related OECD forums and committees. The OECD describes the 
FTA MAP Forum as “a subsidiary body of the OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs [that] brings together Commissioners from 46 countries 
to develop on an equal footing a global response to tax administration 
issues in a collaborative fashion.”133 The FTA MAP Forum was 
“created to deliberate on general matters affecting all participants’ 
MAP programmes,” and has developed a “multilateral strategic plan” 
to improve MAP “in order to meet the needs of both governments 
and taxpayers and so assure the critical role of the MAP in the global 
tax environment.”134 
As a minimum standard with an envisioned outcome rather than a 
specified rule, the dispute resolution standard is distinct from the 
foregoing three minimum standards. It lacks concrete criteria and 
implicitly relies on cooperation among states, rather than being 
capable of unilateral implementation. The other three minimum 
standards are capable of being carried out by states independently, by 
adopting appropriate rules into national legislation and administrative 
practice, regardless of the action or inaction of other states. Even if 
non-cooperation by other states would be damaging to the 
implementing state, the implementation language, and in some cases 
the peer review mechanism, would be capable of measuring 
compliance with the first three minimum standards on a state-by-state 
basis, but that is not the case for dispute resolution. Achieving 
improvements in MAP resolution seems comparatively abstract 
relative to, for example, adopting a nexus-based rule for locating the 
income of intangibles. It is also heavily dependent on the cooperation 
of the partner country with which the dispute has arisen, unless the 
OECD means to imply that states have committed to reducing the 
resolution time even if that means compromising legal principles 
and rules. 
Thus, the dispute resolution minimum standard appears to be a 
modest, incremental step toward the ultimate incorporation of 
 
regularly to deliberate on general matters affecting all participants’ programs for conducting 
mutual agreement procedures.”). 
 132. See Forum on Tax Administration, supra note 4. 
 133. ACTION PLAN 14, supra note 54, at 16 (footnote omitted). 
 134. Id. 
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mandatory binding arbitration—a priority of only a few key OECD 
states at this time. Its inclusion on the MLI agenda and in the Model 
Tax Convention marks this policy as a highly likely candidate for a 
more concrete minimum standard in a future iteration of cooperation 
to counter BEPS. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION ARCHITECTURE: FIVE PILLARS 
Having reviewed the core elements of implementation, we may 
now categorize the BEPS priorities in some fashion by examining the 
nature of their implementation plans. The following table (Table 2) 
summarizes the five mechanisms that will be used to implement the 
various BEPS standards, recommendations, and best practices, or 
what we may describe as the five pillars in the architecture of the 
international tax order. They are: 
 
(1) domestic adoption (law/practice); 
(2) adoption in new bilateral treaties; 
(3) adoption in the forthcoming multilateral 
instrument (MLI); 
(4) adoption in OCED models and guidance; and 
(5) peer review within the OECD Inclusive Framework. 
 
Each of these pillars fulfills a distinct function in the development 
and deployment of global tax norms. It is important to note that as of 
this writing, there is no cross-country comparison of domestic 
legislation implementing BEPS, nor are there drafts of the proposed 
MLI,135 the revised OECD Model, or the revised transfer pricing 
 
 135. On May 31, 2016, the OECD released a document it referred to as a “public 
discussion draft” of the MLI, however there are no terms to be reviewed because, as the OECD 
stated in the Action Plan, “the draft text of the multilateral instrument is the subject of 
intergovernmental discussions in a confidential setting.” OECD, BEPS ACTION 15: 
DEVELOPMENT OF A MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE TAX TREATY RELATED 
BEPS MEASURES 1 (public discussion draft ed. 2016) [hereinafter MLI DISCUSSION 
DRAFT],  http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/BEPS-Discussion-draft-Multilateral-Instrument. 
pdf. Instead, the MLI Discussion Draft explains why the OECD undertook this project and what 
has happened so far, describes what BEPS changes will be covered in the MLI once drafted, lays 
out three “technical issues” the OECD faces in drafting the MLI, and finally gives the call for 
input. Id. at 1–3. The three issues, in brief, are that the MLI must be able to modify existing 
treaties by using “compatibility clauses,” that the MLI will be broadly worded and so will require 
commentary and maybe explanatory notes for consistent interpretation, and that the MLI will 
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guidelines, and only one set of terms of reference for peer review has 
been released.136 Accordingly, the table below contains several areas of 
uncertainty regarding potential overlap or multiplication of 
implementation modes. For example, it is not always clear from the 
OECD’s action plans whether proposed reforms will be introduced 
only in the MLI, only in the OECD Model, only in the transfer pricing 
guidelines, or in some combination thereof; these uncertainties are 
indicated by bracketing prescribed reforms where relevant. 






























































be in French and English but will interpret thousands of treaties written in different languages. 
Id. at 2–3. 
 136. ACTION 14 TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 5. 
 137. For ease in reading, this table omits all citations to the minimum standards discussed 
above and includes only references to action plans not discussed in the foregoing section. 
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The mechanisms used for implementation confirm that CbC 
reporting and exchange, countering treaty abuse, and the IP nexus 
rule are main priority areas for the OECD. Terms of reference 
regarding the scope of peer monitoring will further crystallize these 
high-priority items. At the same time, the presence of alternatives even 
 
 138. ACTION PLAN 1, supra note 67; ACTION PLAN 8-10, supra note 86; OECD, 
PREVENTING THE ARTIFICIAL AVOIDANCE OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT STATUS, ACTION 
7–2015 FINAL REPORT 9–13 (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/
2315341e.pdf. 
 139. ACTION PLAN 11, supra note 67. 
 140. ACTION PLAN 12, supra note 67, at 81–82. 
1603 BEPS and the New International Tax Order 
 1641 
in consensus areas suggests that harmonization will not be achieved in 
this phase of BEPS implementation, and it is not clear how the options 
will be applied in the context of the MLI. 
As the newest pillar in the international tax order, the MLI is 
particularly notable for its potential to permanently alter the 
architecture of international tax relations. The MLI is a multilateral 
agreement designed to be capable of “modifying” all existing tax 
treaties at once.141 The potential impact of the MLI depends very 
much on its legal design, which has not yet been crystallized, but some 
preliminary observations may be made. 
The MLI is not a protocol to existing treaties. Rather, it is a 
separate treaty that is intended to either supplement or address 
specified omissions in existing bilateral treaties without overriding the 
remaining provisions.142 The distinction between supplementing and 
overriding could be significant in terms of the MLI’s operation and 
interpretation. A treaty that is amended by a protocol operates on a 
consolidated basis, under which the protocol explicitly adds wholly 
new provisions or overrides specified provisions in the prior treaty (and 
prior protocols, where applicable), or both.143 A protocol typically 
strikes certain portions of the treaty and inserts new language.144 The 
 
 141. ACTION PLAN 15, supra note 4, at 9. 
 142.  ACTION PLAN 15, supra note 4; see also Bravo, supra note 130, at 347–50. 
 143. See, e.g., Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT’L TAX & 
BUS. LAW. 1, 16–18 (1986) (explaining the process whereby tax treaties are negotiated and 
entered into in the United States); Bravo, supra note 130, at 347–50 (discussing general views 
of hierarchy of authority of treaties). 
 144. For example, the Canada-U.S. double tax convention has been modified multiple 
times by protocol, and the government of Canada provides an unofficial consolidated version 
online. See Convention between Canada and the United States of America with Respect to Taxes 
on Income and on Capital, https://www.fin.gc.ca/treaties-conventions/unitedstates-etatunis-
eng.asp (explaining that this “consolidated version of the Canada-United States Convention 
with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital signed at Washington on September 26, 1980, 
as amended by the Protocols signed on June 14, 1983, March 28, 1984, March 17, 1995, July 
29, 1997, and September 21, 2007, is provided for convenience of reference only and has no 
official sanction”). In contrast, the IRS provides a consolidated version of the same treaty 
through four protocols, and separately includes the most recent protocol. IRS, Canada – Tax 
Treaty Documents, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-businesses/canada-tax-
treaty-documents. Each protocol indicates the portions of the original treaty and prior protocols 
that are thereby struck and what new provisions are added. See, e.g., Protocol Amending the 
Convention Between the United States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income 
and on Capital Done at Washington on 26 September 1980 as Amended by the Protocols Done 
on 14 June 1983, 28 March 1984, 17 March 1995 and 29 July 1997 (2007), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Protocol-
Canada-9-21-2007.pdf. 
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MLI may not be capable of striking portions of existing treaties to the 
extent the text of one treaty diverges from that of the next.145 Further, 
as the MLI will be released only in English and French,146 this problem 
is accentuated by the existence of hundreds of treaties in other 
languages. Because of these difficulties, the MLI is being designed as 
a stand-alone instrument that is to be read in some fashion alongside 
existing treaties. This raises the possibility of inconsistent application 
and interpretation, which is already a central problem in the 
interpretation of existing tax treaties.147 The OECD plans to counter 
this via “compatibility clauses” to attain consistency 
and harmonization.148 
It is not yet clear how the MLI will function in terms of its 
relationship with the existing bilateral treaty network.149 One 
possibility is that the instrument is transitory, and will only extend its 
provisions to current treaties until some future date at which they will 
be modified by protocols. To the extent any treaties remain static 
while others adopt the provisions of the MLI through protocol, the 
MLI would be a permanent treaty but with decreasing applicability 
over time. An opposite result could be that the MLI would itself be 
expanded by protocol, and thereby extend its coverage and ultimately 
replace the bilateral treaties it modifies by making them superfluous 
or defunct. If that happens, the multilateral modification function may 
be an exercise in creeping harmonization as well as a means to 
 
 145. While most bilateral tax treaties are based at least in part on the OECD Model, this 
does not ensure consistency, as each treaty is ultimately the product of bargaining between 
the parties. 
 146. MLI DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 135, at 3. 
 147. Vogel, supra note 143, at 29–43. 
 148. See Bravo, supra note 130, at 343. 
 149. The discussion that ensued at a public meeting regarding the MLI in July 2016 
demonstrated that the technical workings of this instrument were at that time yet unknown. See 
Public Consultation on the Multilateral Instrument to Implement the Tax-Treaty Related BEPS 
Measures, OECD (July 7, 2016), http://video.oecd.org/2878/or/Public-consultation-of-the-
Ad-Hoc-Group-on-the-Multilateral-Instrument.html [hereinafter OECD Public Consultation] 
(providing meeting transcript and video recording). Some commentators thought the OECD 
should develop new commentary to be developed to explain the MLI, that new commentary 
should supersede existing commentary to the OECD Model, that any country signing on to the 
MLI should be required to sign on to the commentary as well, that national interpretations of 
the MLI should be subject to peer review within the OECD, and that national interpretations 
of the MLI should be made public in order to build a common approach and expose inconsistent 
positions. OECD, COMMENTS RECEIVED ON PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT, BEPS ACTION 15: 
DEVELOPMENT OF A MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE TAX TREATY RELATED 
BEPS MEASURES (2016), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/public-comments-received-
discussion-draft-Development-of-MLI-to-Implement-Tax-Treaty-related-BEPS-Measures.pdf. 
1603 BEPS and the New International Tax Order 
 1643 
gradually ossify other forms of OECD soft law into hard law. This 
seems especially likely to the extent provisions in the MLI are also 
replicated in the OECD Model, since this would reopen the discussion 
about the legal status of the commentaries to the OECD Model. 
Moreover, if the commentaries are drafted by working parties of 
OECD members, there is a divergence of participation. 
Like the other four pillars of international tax, the MLI appears 
intended to bring about a much more cohesive integration of 
international tax policies across sovereign states. It is, finally, the 
multilateral agreement on tax that the original experts at the League 
of Nations had so hoped for and worked toward. 
If the OECD is successful in achieving its goals in developing the 
MLI, the logic of further integration and harmonization through 
multilateral regulatory and quasi-judicial review will be primary topics 
for negotiation in the not-too distant future. The architecture of BEPS 
implementation thus takes on an important role as patterns of agenda-
setting and norms of inclusion and participation determined today set 
the stage for cooperation tomorrow. 
Arguably, the Inclusive Framework is the key accomplishment of 
the BEPS initiative, as this is the means by which the OECD will 
cement its position as the institution where tax policy development 
takes place for the foreseeable future. The OECD made three 
promises to all countries that join the Inclusive Framework: first, that 
the OECD measures will protect the participant country’s tax base; 
second, that participation in the framework will enable the country to 
be “part of an inclusive dialogue on an equal footing [to] directly 
shap[e] the standard setting and monitoring processes on BEPS 
issues”; and third, that participation will allow countries to access 
“capacity building support for the implementation process including 
guidance on developing Action Plans for BEPS implementation.”150 
These are common forms of soft law governance designed to ensure 
states comply even in the absence of legal consequences 
for noncompliance. 
In the summer of 2016, the OECD gathered representatives of 
more than eighty countries in Kyoto to discuss the structure and 
functions of the Inclusive Framework, which will include drawing up 
 
 150. OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: A GLOBAL ANSWER TO A GLOBAL ISSUE 
2 (2016), https://www.oecd.org/tax/flyer-implementing-the-beps-package-building-an-
inclusive-framework.pdf. 
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terms of reference for peer review and monitoring.151 The OECD set 
up a steering group and decided on procedure for accepting new 
members to transition on timeline requirements.152 The task of the 
steering group is to determine how peer review on the various 
minimum standards and peer monitoring of related prescriptions will 
proceed.153 The steering group membership is made up of twelve of 
the member countries of the G20 in addition to eight BEPS 
Associates.154 The Inclusive Framework thus introduces a potential 
avenue for non-OECD countries to have a meaningful say in norm 
building exercises undertaken by the OECD, but with a great deal of 
agenda-setting directed mainly by OECD member states, the 
outcome is not yet certain. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
With the combined elements and mechanisms of BEPS, including 
the use of the new Inclusive Framework to monitor national 
compliance with the minimum standards and achieve consensus on 
issues that fell short of universal agreement in the current initiative, 
the OECD might be said to be giving birth to a new global tax order 
complete with rules, audits, and reform processes. There will most 
certainly be a BEPS 2.0 and beyond. A still-unanswered question is 
whether the expanding forum can successfully rally non-OECD 
countries behind OECD-led initiatives for the indefinite future. This 
is perhaps not the order envisioned by those who have in the past 
called for global tax coordination in a supranational body for the sake 
of pursuing global tax justice. If the OECD-based regime is not fully 
supranational yet, it is close. The development of the first truly 
multilateral agreement on tax, as the original architects of 
 
 151. First Meeting of the New Inclusive Framework to Tackle Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Marks a New Era in International Tax Co-operation, OECD.ORG (June 30, 2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/georgia/first-meeting-of-the-new-inclusive-framework-to-
tackle-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-marks-a-new-era-in-international-tax-co-operation.htm 
[hereinafter First Meeting]. 
 152. OECD, DOC. NO. DCD/DAC/RD(2016)12/RD1, TAX AND DEVELOPMENT: AN 
UPDATE 2 (2016) [hereinafter TAX AND DEVELOPMENT: AN UPDATE], 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/RD
(2016)12/RD1&docLanguage=En (explaining the developments at the Kyoto meeting and 
describing the composition of the steering group). 
 153. OECD, First Meeting, supra note 151. 
 154. See OECD, Steering Group of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Members, at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/steering-group-of-the-inclusive-framework-on-beps.pdf. 
1603 BEPS and the New International Tax Order 
 1645 
international tax cooperation first envisioned a century ago, is a 
significant step. 
In particular, establishing an Inclusive Framework is a momentous 
event in international tax governance. It seems clear that in developing 
a wholly new institution to bring OECD and non-OECD members 
together in a problem-solving forum, the OECD seeks to create a 
body that appears for all purposes to be as inclusive as the United 
Nations. However, the new OECD forum is not in fact similarly 
inclusive—the BEPS initiative was initiated by and for its member 
countries, and extension beyond the OECD is generally meant to 
further the agreed agenda rather than open up the discussion to 
consider new items.155 
Even so, the Inclusive Framework might facilitate the participation 
of stakeholders beyond member country government representatives 
and private sector tax professionals, namely the nongovernmental 
sector. Nongovernmental organizations, such as the Tax Justice 
Network, were instrumental in creating the socio-political conditions 
that led the OECD to develop the BEPS initiative, and they will have 
an interest in participating in tax governance going forward. At least 
some nongovernmental organizations and independent researchers 
have called for an international tax organization that would bring 
together all countries to engage in cooperation and end tax 
competition. The OECD’s new Inclusive Framework may not be the 
 
 155. See TAX AND DEVELOPMENT: AN UPDATE, supra note 152, at 2 (describing the 
OECD agenda and explaining that the OECD’s goal is to “build[] on previous efforts to 
integrate and support developing countries into the norm setting work of the OECD”); see also 
Dagan, supra note 22, at 17–18. That the agenda setting stage has passed is confirmed in the 
Action 14 Terms of Reference, which explains that 
 [t]he terms of reference do not alter the Action 14 minimum standard and in case of 
any differences arising from the interpretation of any elements of the terms of 
reference and the Action 14 minimum standard, the review of the assessed jurisdiction 
shall be conducted based on the minimum standard contained in the 2015 Action 
14 Report.  
ACTION 14 TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 5, at 9. This suggests that any concerns not raised 
in the context of the preparation of the 2015 Action 14 Report will not be raised in the 
implementation phase. It is possible, however, that the OECD will consider new ideas and issues 
in 2020. The OECD has implied in discussions with non-OECD states that there may be room 
for such deliberation. TAX AND DEVELOPMENT: AN UPDATE, supra note 152, at 2 (“The 
Inclusive Framework is already providing a venue for developing countries to raise new ideas and 
concerns, supported by more institutionalised regional meetings of the Framework. There are 
already calls on the OECD to help on tax policy analysis, and some fundamental tax issues of 
concern to developing countries (such as the allocation of taxing rights between source or 
residence countries) are surfacing.”). 
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one envisioned by these tax justice advocates, but it may prove to be 
adaptable to their purposes. 
As the OECD moves from building and articulating consensus 
positions to implementing agreed standards, recommendations, and 
best practices in the BEPS process, the organization is both expanding 
and hardening the multiple ways in which it manages global tax policy 
discourse. The BEPS action reports are merely the beginning of an 
iterative cycle of pluralistic legal regime development. The 
implementation phase will provide a rich array of data for further 
analysis in the years to come. 
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